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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will explore the security implications of water scarcity through an 
examination of the politics of water in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The thesis will 
argue that when water is viewed in terms of security interdependence (as in South Asia) 
rather than economic interdependence (as in Central Asia), states are more inclined to 
successfully cooperate. The cases of South and Central Asia investigated in this thesis 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of being geographically an upstream or 
downstream state and the means by which governments in the two regions have 
attempted to forge cooperation and reciprocity. 
In order to assess the potential for conflict over water resources, the thesis relies 
heavily on cooperation theory—that states will continue to cooperate assuming the long-
term benefits of cooperation on water sharing outweigh short-term benefits of non-
cooperation to meet domestic water demands. The South and Central Asia cases vary 
with respect to the positions of relative power between upstream and downstream states 
and the tenor of post-independence relations. While the majority of water disputes in both 
regions (with less success in Central Asia) have been resolved through diplomacy and 
treaties, the next ten to twenty years will likely present unparalleled challenges of greater 
complexity to water sharing efforts. The two case studies present contrasting regions at 
different stages of cooperative development over water. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, global issues surrounding environmental strains and diminishing 
natural resources have come to light on the international stage. While debate progresses 
on the future effects of global warming, states are left with the sobering prospect:  In the 
near and long term, the struggle to provide basic essentials such as water and energy will 
become only more difficult as populations increase and environmental degradation 
continues. Even when focusing on water alone, as this thesis does, the problems arising 
from shortages can branch off into a plethora of domestic problems—from basic 
sanitation to energy production shortfalls. The issues compound further when states share 
the same source of water and are forced to balance international sharing agreements 
against the benefits of its population. A government is likely to choose to take action to 
ensure its population is provided for; however, what does a state risk if such action 
exacerbates tensions with neighboring states? How far will states go to provide for its 
population, or reciprocally punish a state for breaching its promise? At what point is the 
value of future cooperation less than the present needs of states?   
This thesis will explore the security implications of water scarcity through an 
examination of the politics of water in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The thesis will 
argue that when water is viewed in terms of security interdependence (as in South Asia) 
rather than economic interdependence (as in Central Asia), states are more inclined to 
successfully cooperate.  
The last official “water war” took place 4,500 years ago, between two Sumerian 
city-states over irrigation rights.1 While no outright declared wars over water have 
occurred between sovereign states since then, several disputes and armed conflicts have 
erupted over water rights and control.2 Presently, due to increased shortages of water 
                                                 
1 “Water Wars Loom? But None in Past 4,500 Years,” Reuters News Wire, 17 September 2006. 
2 Recent water-based disputes include the Maavilaru waterway in Sri Lanka and the Mekong River 
Delta. See “Water and War in Sri Lanka,”  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5239570.stm and “Asia’s 
Coming Water Wars,” http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=545&language_id=1.  
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resources, the probability of state-to-state tensions over water resources appears higher in 
cases where there are shared rivers and one state controls the downstream flow. Although 
the sharing of water resources is common in state relations, the once taken for granted 
practice may become more tenuous as water resources shrink. This scarcity is due to the 
combination of increased demand—in the form of population growth and increased 
economic development—and fluctuating supply, arising from environmental degradation 
and the normal irregularity in natural production of water resources. For states attempting 
to maintain a consistent level of development, increasing scarcity poses a threat to 
nascent or historical water-sharing agreements. With the growing demand on an 
increasingly limited and fluctuating resource, the pressures on these agreements and 
consistent reciprocity will continue to be tested. 
The cases of South and Central Asia investigated in this thesis illustrate the 
advantages and disadvantages of being geographically upstream or downstream, and the 
means by which governments in the two regions have attempted to forge cooperation and 
reciprocity. Independent of its upstream location, India has had the strategic advantage in 
light of its overall conventional military dominance and superior economic achievement 
in comparison to downstream Pakistan. Since partition, India and Pakistan have found 
multiple reasons to stir and escalate tensions, but the Kashmir territorial dispute remains 
the central contentious wedge, illustrated through wars in 1947 and 1965, and the 1999 
Kargil conflict.3  
While Kashmir will likely remain an unresolved and contentious issue, focus has 
shifted towards economic development in both countries and, in the case of Pakistan, 
financial solvency. India must keep up with its own economic development by fulfilling 
its growing energy demands, with hydroelectric generation as an important and necessary 
option for the country.4 However, India’s development of new hydroelectric dams could 
have serious consequences for the downstream flow of rivers that run towards Pakistan’s 
                                                 
3 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2004), 51–54. 
4 Prior to the 2007 global financial crisis, India and Pakistan have both maintained a steady 9.0 percent 
and 6.7 percent GDP growth rate respectively in recent years. See The Economist (July 2006-7) spanning 
the past 12 months. 
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agricultural heartland. Given the already tenuous relationship between India and Pakistan, 
rife with paranoia, the mere possibility of India manipulating its strategic control and 
potential economic strangulation through river flow dominance is a cause for deep 
concern in Pakistan. Pakistan has already clarified that economic strangulation is one of 
its supposed “red lines,” which, if crossed, would result in escalatory conflict.5 Pakistani 
officials believe such economic coercion could be carried out through the manipulation of 
essential water supplies. Therefore, the ongoing damming and hydroelectric development 
in Indian Kashmir, is seen by Pakistan as a potential threat to its water supply. India, 
meanwhile, sees the dam development as an inherent right and necessity to provide 
energy through waters to which India has lawful claim.6 In February 2008, the World 
Bank concluded its arbitration, reinforcing the legality of India’s Baglihar Dam 
construction on the Chenab River; this result increased concern in Pakistan over Indian 
dominance of water resources. Chapter II will investigate the complaint, arbitration, and 
resolutions of the World Bank’s decision on the Baglihar Dam. The chapter will explore 
how the security interdependence developed over the decades has resulted in consistent 
cooperation to resolve water disagreements. 
In Central Asia, in contrast, it is the upstream riparian states of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan that are at a disadvantage in comparison to their water-dependent yet resource-
rich neighbors Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which have supplies of natural gas and crude 
oil. No longer under Soviet authority, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have had to 
develop regional resource-sharing agreements as independent nations. Shaky agreements 
between the CARs have consistently collapsed, as indigenous needs have trumped pre-
established water arrangements. The challenge for these countries is to form binding 
treaties while at the same time allowing each state to develop and capitalize on their 
internal resources and industries. How will this relatively new cluster of independent 
                                                 
5 Quote from Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan Army. He describes the 
possibility of using nuclear weapons “when deterrence fails in the event India proceeds to the economic 
strangling of Pakistan.” See, “Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan: A concise 
report of a visit by Landau Network - Centro Volta” (Italy: Landau Network-Centro Volta, 21 January 
2002), Section 5.  
6 Indus Water Treaty (1960), Article III, Section 2.  
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states establish working reciprocity without a central managing authority? Will the weak 
economic interdependence formed over past decades lead to ongoing cooperation failure? 
Chapter III examines these questions.   
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SOURCES 
In order to assess the potential for conflict over water resources, the thesis relies 
heavily on cooperation theory—that states will continue to cooperate assuming the long-
term benefits of cooperation on water sharing outweigh short-term benefits of non-
cooperation to meet domestic water demands. The thesis relies on the game theoretic 
concept of prisoners’ dilemma to understand the dynamics of states’ cooperation and 
defection from international water-sharing agreements. Robert Axelrod, a proponent of 
cooperation theory, argues defection among players and the ability to develop sustainable 
cooperation is dependent on keeping the value of future cooperation greater than the 
benefits of defection in the present.7 With Central Asia, a bloc of relatively new nations 
is struggling to reconcile economic interdependence without Soviet decision-making 
authority. Without the risk of security consequences, energy-deficient, upstream 
controlling states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan choose annual defection in order to 
maintain essential energy production.  
Since partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought primarily over territorial 
rights, but both sides still view each other with a strong sense of mistrust and paranoia on 
a wide range of topics. However, the anticipation of conflict has led to relative stability in 
cooperation over water. Robert Keohane argues, “cooperation should not be viewed as 
the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without 
the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.”8 In the case of South Asia, this 
“specter” manifests itself through security interdependence—that non-cooperation with 
the likely consequences of armed conflict is far more costly than continued cooperation. 
While South Asia has maintained relative stability over water, tensions and harsh rhetoric 
                                                 
7 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 126. 
8 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 54. 
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continue to grow, but the water continues to flow. Future cooperation between India and 
Pakistan is likely because the consequences of conflict over a strategically important 
resource would lead to disaster for both sides. However, as resources strains develop, the 
cost of cooperation for both sides will continue to rise.  
Additional perspectives on environmental conflict and riparian issues focus on the 
following themes: scarcity in natural resources, and its effects on state stability; state-to-
state historical disputes over water resources; and emerging water disagreements.9 As a 
single issue, water will likely not be the sole cause of conflict between states, but will 
contribute to stress and relations in conjunction with existing political, economic, and 
cultural causes of conflict.10 Additionally, environmental conflicts can manifest 
themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts, 
reasserting the argument that water is a component and catalyst to other issues, leading to 
conflict.11 The governments in South and Central Asia are attempting to formulate new 
and adaptive measures to manage water resources to find and increase long-term benefits 
and thereby solidify the incentives for long-term and stable water cooperation. The thesis 
will examine whether the adaptive measures taken in the two regions have succeeded or 
failed towards improving the chances for long-term cooperation on water.  
B. SOURCES  
The thesis relies on public statements and news reports of government statements 
regarding water, academic and news articles on riparian issues focusing on the dilemmas 
facing upstream and downstream states, and official government reports and treaties as 
                                                 
9 For broad ranging literature on future implications of natural resources on state stability see, Thomas 
Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin 
Group, 2004), 202–6. Also see, Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (New York: Verso, 2006), 203–204. 
10 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 105–106. 
11 “Environmental Conflicts are characterized by the principal importance of degradation in one or 
more of the following fields: overuse of renewable resources; overstrain of the environment’s sink capacity 
(pollution); impoverishment of the space of living.” Stephen Libiszewski, “What is an Environmental 
Conflict,” in International Security: Challenges in a Changing World, eds. Kurt Spillmann and Joachim 
Krause (Zurich: Center for International Relations and Security Network, 2004), 14. 
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sources of data for analysis.12 Specifically, the text of the Indus Water Treaty and United 
Nations and World Bank reports on the regions are used. In addition, works by Robert 
Axelrod and Robert Keohane on international cooperation theory form the foundation of 
the theoretical framework explaining the actions of states in regards to water decisions.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The South and Central Asia cases vary with respect to the positions of relative 
power between upstream and downstream states and the tenor of post-independence 
relations. While the majority of water disputes in both regions (with less success in 
Central Asia) have been resolved through diplomacy and treaties, the next ten to twenty 
years will likely present unparalleled challenges of greater complexity to water sharing 
efforts. The two case studies present contrasting regions at different stages of cooperative 
development over water.  
The South Asian region presents uniform power asymmetries between the two 
regional powers that have historic tendencies towards conflict, but that have displayed 
relative foresight on how they have dealt with water disputes. In South Asia, upstream 
India is predominately seen as militarily and economically superior to downstream 
Pakistan, although both states are nuclear powers. However, the relationship is governed 
by a seemingly robust international agreement, the Indus Water Treaty. The case study 
analyzes how India and Pakistan approach disputes over water and the strengths and 
weaknesses associated with the means the two nations use to resolve water 
disagreements.  
The Central Asian case study offers a contrasting example of states that are still 
trying to establish consistent cooperation over water disagreements in the wake collapsed 
Soviet-imposed sharing agreements. In contrast to the South Asian case, the upstream 
states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are militarily and economically weak in comparison 
to their downstream neighbors Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. While 
                                                 
12 Ian Small et al., “Safe Water for the Aral Sea Area: Could It Get Worse?” European Journal of 
Public Health 13, no. 1 (2003), 87; Aaron Wolf, “Water Scarcity and the Risk of Conflict with Countries,” 
in Water Scarcity and Conflict, ed. Leif Ohlsson (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 1995), 232. 
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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan control the downward flow into greater Central Asia, 
downstream states are able to exert pressure on these upstream governments to provide 
the same water distribution levels during Soviet control through desperately needed 
energy supplements. The upstream states, lacking indigenous energy resources, depend 
on these downstream energy supplements in combination with indigenous hydroelectric 
generation to maintain their energy needs. Cooperation, however, consistently fails 
during the winter months, when more energy is necessary; the Central Asian upstream 
states are forced to release more water for energy generation, leaving less available for 
the downstream states in the summer months, which rely on the downstream flow for 
their agricultural industries. Energy shortfalls among the upstream states during the 
winter months have caused the upstream states to break numerous water sharing 
agreements. In response, the downstream states have cut off natural gas supplies to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, leaving them in a worsening energy dilemma that 
compromises the agricultural industries of the downstream as well as upstream states.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II covers historic and current South Asian river rights and dam 
construction, which has become an irritant in Indo-Pakistani relations. At the heart of the 
water relationship between the two countries is the Indus Water Treaty. Chapter II 
explores whether cooperation over water is likely to be maintained and future disputes 
are likely to be restricted to rhetoric because of the developed security interdependence. 
Will both sides continue to respect the Indus Water Treaty and heed international 
arbitration? Is it likely that water will be used as coercive tool when other issues are 
straining the relationship or are the costs of choosing defection over ongoing cooperation 
too high? 
Chapter III examines current issues surrounding Central Asian water rights, the 
strategic power of upstream states, and their ability to position themselves toward 
dependent downstream states. The chapter assesses the prospects for cooperation along 
the lines of Soviet-era agreements and whether the new context of economic 
interdependence and development make cooperation failure more likely. It analyzes the 
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behavior of the CARs to address whether cooperation failure is inevitable if upstream 






II. SOUTH ASIA 
The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. 
Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but 
failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that lead to extremism 
and terrorism.13 
—Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, 28 January 2009 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 India and Pakistan have faced a number of contentious issues since partition in 
1947. Territorial disputes over Kashmir, religious and ethnic strife, language conflicts, or 
asymmetric attacks and retaliation, have constantly fed instability in the region. In each 
case defeat, coercion, or deterrence, and in some cases a blending of all three play a role 
in eventual resolution of South Asian conflicts.14 While these conflicts yield short-term 
resolutions, a shadow of conflict lingers largely due to the symbolic question of control 
over Kashmir. However, despite multiple conflicts in the region in the past 60 years, 
water-sharing issues, in comparison, remain a conflict restricted to rhetorical clashes, 
largely due to the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 and security interdependence that 
has developed over time. Considering that Indo-Pakistani relations are historically 
consumed with enmity and paranoia, the stability surrounding this essential resource of 
such strategic and economic importance is a surprise. However, the pressure to maintain 
economic development in India and remain fiscally solvent in Pakistan will increasingly 
test this trend of dormancy. India and Pakistan stand at a crossroads, where the two states 
will need to build off and evolve from the successes of the IWT and approach water in a 
regionally cooperative manner.   
First, this chapter describes the history of Indo-Pakistani water sharing rights from 
partition to the eventual signing of the IWT. The second section focuses on recent strains 
                                                 
13 Asif Ali Zardari, “Partnering With Pakistan,” The Washington Post, 28 January 2009. 
14 The concept of coercion in South Asian affairs is addressed in, Verghese Koithara, “Coercion and 




on the IWT, specifically arising out of India’s construction of the Baglihar dam in Jammu 
Kashmir. The third and fourth section addresses the trends towards marketization of 
water and future prospects for water issues in South Asia. These sections connect the 
central argument that while India and Pakistan historically followed and accepted 
established treaties, development and growth pressures, degradation of fresh water 
resources, increased Pakistani economic dependence on shared water, and historical 
enmity will test and strain the IWT. However, due to India and Pakistan’s history of 
reliance on treaties towards resolving water disputes, the region will likely adapt better to 
interstate water crises because of these lessons learned and the very high cost of 
cooperation failure—leading to potential armed conflict—for either state. 
B. HISTORIC WATER RIGHTS ISSUES AND THE INDUS WATER 
TREATY OF 1960 
 Water distribution and allocation rights concerns are not new to South Asia. The 
British administration from 1860 to 1947 made large investments into the Indus basin 
irrigation system, making it the largest continuous irrigation system in the world, with a 
command area of roughly 20 million hectares and annual irrigation capacity of more than 
12 million hectares.15 The Government of India Act of 1935 placed the distribution and 
control of water under provincial rule for the first time.16 Prior to the Act, the central 
British authority settled disputes over water irrigation, but as a precursor to eventual 
independence, water rights were localized as an element of the Government of India Act. 
Once water rights became localized, disputes immediately occurred on areas of extensive 
irrigation, including the provinces of Punjab and Sindh.17   
After the Radcliffe Lines were hastily drawn in 1947, resulting in the partition of 
Pakistan and India, much of the region fell into disarray because of the resulting mass 
cross-border migration. While the British focus was on fair distribution in terms of 
population, the Radcliffe Lines complicated the distribution of water in the Indus river 
                                                 
15 Ashok Swain, “Environmental Cooperation in South Asia,” eds. Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. 
Dabelko (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2002), 66. 




system. Before partition, as Figure 1 illustrates, “the Indus irrigation system was 
envisaged to alleviate the water shortage in the Sutlej Valley Project (a primary tributary 
river for the Indus) by the addition of canals to bring water from the west, together with a 
dam and large storage reservoir to be built at Bhakra on the Sutlej. However, partition left 
Bhakra in India and thus aggravated the problem of shortages in the Sutlej Valley Canals 
(in West Pakistan).”18  Due to high agricultural development in the region, the state was 
forced to look towards the Upper Bari Doab for additional water. It built links of up to 63 
miles in order to bring water from the Ravi and Chenab rivers in 1951 and 1954.19  
The borders—quickly drawn without a genuine understanding over water 
distribution—led to disputes almost instantly after independence. In 1948, a serious 
dispute over shared water occurred when India halted water supplies to some Pakistani 
canals at the start of the summer irrigation season.20 India halted the water supplies 
because of the ambiguity surrounding water distribution after partition and to fulfill water 
needs of the time.21 Immediate negotiations did not resolve the issue and the action by 
India led to the deprivation of water from approximately 5.5 percent of Pakistan’s 
agricultural area.22 While violent confrontation did not ensue, such provincial disputes 
foreshadowed eventual problems and the need for a binding treaty to settle upstream and 
downstream water distribution disputes. After the first Kashmir War of 1947, India and 
Pakistan had set a path towards hostile relations that would not be resolved in the near-
term, therefore, a binding water distribution agreement needed to be established to stymie 
a potential flash point in relations. 
                                                 
18 Pieter Lieftinck, Water and Power Resources of West Pakistan: A Study in Sector Planning 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 10. Before 1971, Pakistan was divided between East Pakistan 
(modern Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (modern Pakistan). References to West Pakistan refer to modern 
Pakistan. 
19 Ibid., 10. 
20 G. T. Keith Pitman, “The Role of the World Bank in Enhancing Cooperation and Resolving 
Conflict on International Watercourses: The Case of the Indus Basin,” in M. A. Salman. and Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes, eds., International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict, 
World Bank technical paper no. 414 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1998). Cited in Swain, 





The issue of upstream river control versus downstream water usage lies at the 
heart of the IWT. Once the borders were drawn, West Pakistan found itself in a 
precarious position of negotiating with an upstream power that needed to look towards its 
own national interests. As Ken Conca notes, 
Balancing upstream and downstream rights and responsibilities is the most 
contentious aspect of bargaining over watercourse conventions. As several 
analysts have pointed out, and as the negotiating parties clearly 
understood, there are potentially profound tensions between the principle 
of equitable and reasonable use and the principle of no significant harm to 
other watercourse states. The principle of no significant harm is generally 
seen to favor downstream states, in that upstream development of water 
resources may deny water to human and natural uses downstream, thereby 
causing significant harm. The principle of equitable use, in contrast, is 
generally seen to favor upstream states seeking to develop water 
resources, in the sense that it gives them a legal basis for claiming and 
using their fair share of the water.23 
The IWT, therefore, was an attempt to accommodate the interests of both upstream India 
and downstream Pakistan.24 In Article III, Section I of the IWT, the section on 
“Provisions Regarding Western Rivers” specifically states that, “Pakistan shall receive 
for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation 
to let flow…”25 Furthermore, Article III of the treaty clarifies four conditions in which 
India can “interfere” with the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab: (1) Domestic Use; (2) 
Non-Consumptive Use; (3) Agricultural Use; and (4) Generation of hydro-electric 
power.26 As seen in the treaty, the articles leave room for interpretation in the usage of 
rivers by the upstream power for its national domestic interests. 
International distribution concerns can only exacerbate the domestic pressures 
within each country. Water distribution arguments are not just an international issue 
between India and Pakistan but have also become domestic disputes that place pressure 
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on their respective governments. In Pakistan, disputes continuously arise over fair water 
distribution between the Punjab and Sindh provinces.27 In January 2010, The Sindh 
Assembly passed a joint resolution opposing the construction of a proposed power plant 
at the Chashma-Jhelum Link canal on the grounds that it is likely to compound the water 
situation in the province and would only add to continuous mistrust between the 
provinces.28 In India, inter-state disputes are a routine occurrence and when resolutions 
cannot be easily resolved, they are then moved to tribunal arbitration according to the 
Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956.29 Even without international distribution issues, 
water allocation has a tremendous effect on domestic stability. Especially in Pakistan 
where the Sindh and Balochistan provinces face multiple water choke points before it 
reaches their territory domestic unrest can easily be fomented—whether blame is due to 
international or domestic reasons. 
India faces a growing dilemma regarding its obligations to the IWT and its 
demographic challenges. India is home to one-sixth of the world’s population while only 
endowed with one-twenty-fifth of the world’s available water resources.30  The language 
of the IWT calls for “equitable utilization” of the Indus Water System by both sides, 
however, Pakistan is allocated 75 percent of water distribution; as India continues to 
develop economically, exploitation of Indian water resources will likely lead to water 
distribution disputes and heavier reliance on the IWT (through the World Bank) to 
redefine the term “equitable utilization.”31 
Pakistan already faces a projected water crisis due to overexploitation of its 
indigenous ground and surface water supplies. According to a World Bank report 
“Pakistan is close to using all of its available water resources in most years. The bottom 
line is clear -- Pakistan is currently close to using all of the surface and groundwater that 
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http://india.gov.in/sectors/water_resources/river_water.php (accessed on 10 January 2010). 
30 United Nations Environment Programme, “Fresh Water Under Threat: South Asia.”  
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it has available, yet it is projected that over 30 percent more water will be needed over the 
next 20 years to meet increased agricultural, domestic and industrial demands.”32 As 
Pakistan continues to struggle through economic hardships, the dependence on water will 
increase in order to maintain economic sustainability. Any cuts in allocation will likely 
have significant ramifications for these water dependent sectors. To put in perspective, 
Pakistan can only store up to 30 days worth of water (as compared to the 900 days 
capacity for the United States), therefore the country is extremely reliant on the output 
originating from India.33 
While one of the functions of the IWT is to allow fair distribution of water to 
include guaranteed downstream access to Pakistan, the presence of four conditions ((1) 
Domestic Use; (2) Non-Consumptive Use; (3) Agricultural Use; and (4) Generation of 
hydro-electric power)  in the IWT are broad enough to allow reinterpretation.34 
Additionally, Annexe F of the treaty contains conditions under which a neutral 
representative can be brought in “to determine the component of water availability for the 
use of Pakistan.”35 Once a neutral representative is brought in by the World Bank to hear 
testimony and expert opinion, the representative can determine whether the treaty is 
being adhered to properly. The question rests on whether the decision will be accepted 
without objection or if future cooperation will be considered more costly than defection 
from the treaty.   
C. THE CHENAB RIVER AND BAGLIHAR HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 
 In Indian administrated Kashmir, the Chenab River flows downstream from the 
mountains crossing the border into Pakistani Punjab. In 1999, India initiated the 
construction of the Baglihar plant in the Doda district of Kashmir and according to Indian 
officials, the purpose of the project was to supply power (up to 450 MW) to Indian 
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administrated Kashmir. 36 The Indian argument is fairly straightforward: India constantly 
needs energy, and the dam will provide an essential energy supply to Kashmir.37 In all 
respects, India is adhering to Article III, Section one of the IWT, under which 
hydroelectric damming, which restricts water flow, is deemed acceptable under proper 
guidelines. 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Indus Rivers38 
                                                 
36 BBC News Online, “Pakistan Team Views Kashmir Dam,” July 25, 2005. 
37 Ibis.  
38 Figure from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 
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Pakistan, however, feels threatened by the dam and its potential to significantly 
reduce the downstream water flow. The Chenab River flows through most of Pakistan 
and eventually connects with the Indus. The Chenab River is a critical water artery for 
irrigation and sustains the agricultural industry in western Punjab. In the last several 
years, the increased draught conditions in both Pakistan and India limits their water 
supplies. Pakistan claims that the new dam provides India with the ability to restrict the 
water flow or possibly submerge the area based on the design of the release gates.39 
Whether the claims are valid or not, Pakistan is genuinely concerned about Indian 
posturing and ability to control a vital component of its agricultural sustainability—
making this not only an economic and a security concern. 
On 15 January 2005, Pakistan formally requested World Bank arbitration and for 
a Neutral Expert (NE) to be appointed according to Article IX of the IWT to resolve its 
concerns over the Baglihar Plant. The following was one of three claims submitted by the 
Pakistani government to the World Bank for arbitration. “Pakistan is of the considered 
view that the design of the Baglihar Plant on Chenab Main does not conform to criteria 
(e) and (a) specified in Paragraph 8 of Annexure D to the IWT and that the Plant design is 
not based on correct, rational and realistic estimates of maximum flood discharge at the 
site.”40 The Indian government formally disagreed with any Pakistani claimed violations. 
Over the course of two years, the World Bank made multiple visits to the dam site and set 
about its interpretation of the IWT versus the claims of violation. 
In February 2007, after months of delay, the World Bank NE, Mr. Raymond 
Lafitte, came to a decision over the Baglihar dam in which both India and Pakistan 
claimed victory. 41 The decision satisfied India because the overall design of the dam 
remained intact with some minor changes, which would not affect its energy production 
goals.42  Pakistan came away with a perceived victory because India was forced to reduce 
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the height of the release gates on the dam, deeming India in violation on certain counts.43 
However, within several months, new contentious issues arouse in which the opposing 
needs of India and Pakistan once again tested the treaty. The World Bank decision 
appeased both sides temporarily, but inflammatory rhetoric resurfaced over perceived 
Indian manipulation. 
In October 2008, Pakistan accused India of blocking water flow into the Chenab 
River, causing significant agricultural damage to the Punjab region.44 According to 
Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, India completely blocked the supply of regular 
water (23,000 cubic feet per second (Cusec) a day) to Pakistan from the Chenab River, 
affecting Pakistan’s share of irrigation water.45 After the allegations in the press, Pakistan 
confronted India officially over the dispute, demanding compensation for the loss in 
which India rejected the claim. While Pakistan’s request for compensation was denied by 
India, and the complaint did not move forward to the World Bank, the dispute over water 
rights reached an argumentative level between the Prime Minister of India and the 
President of Pakistan. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari stated, “Pakistan would be 
paying a very high price for India’s move to block Pakistan’s water supply from the 
Chenab River.”46 President Zardari further noted that any violation of the 1960 IWT by 
India “would damage the bilateral ties the two countries had built over the years.”47 In 
contrast, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh refuted any potential IWT violation and noted 
during the inauguration of the Baglihar project that “electricity is crucial for the 
development of industry and the project will give a push to the industrialization of 
[Kashmir].”48 This reinforces the evolving divergence of Pakistani concerns over 
inequitable distribution versus Indian pronouncements of needing to continue its national 
development.  
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The statements by the two leaders reveal the divided priorities and evolving 
stresses on the IWT. Pakistan fears India’s control of the water output, while India wants 
to maintain its progressive developmental stride. With the expanding needs of the 
Pakistani agricultural industry to consistently deliver, the need for India to generate more 
energy, and an ever-growing population in the region, fresh water will only become more 
and more scarce. Compounding this problem, water in South Asia is widely seen as a 
strategic and “symbolic capital,” connected to the larger dispute over Kashmir.49 As 
recently as June 2009, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi accused India 
of continuous IWT violations that could “lead to heightened tensions between the two 
countries if ignored.”50 Rhetorical jabs are not uncommon between the two states, 
however, as South Asia continues to develop, the IWT’s ability to evolve with and 
continue to be the primary method towards water dispute resolution will be critical in 
halting any escalations of tensions over water in the region.   
D. MARKETIZATION OF WATER  
While the IWT provides guidelines for water allocation as required during the 
1960s, the first glimpses of these evolving problems can be seen through the Baglihar 
dam disputes and its water marketization value. According to Conca, “When applied to 
water, structural adjustment conditionality and neoliberal policy reform have produced 
pressures [towards] the marketization of water. The result is a set of strong 
pronouncements as to how water should be managed, emphasizing its character as a 
natural resource good with economic value.”51 This is highly relevant when applied to 
South Asia’s allocation of the region’s limited resources. Looking at the Baglihar dam, 
India views the resource as an opportunity to expand its energy production in the area 
bolstering industrial capabilities in the region, while Pakistan views the dam as a threat to 
its already draught ridden agricultural economy.  
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Applying Conca’s terminology to South Asia, India would be a “leader” because 
of its need to further capitalize on its resource and Pakistan the “laggard” for contesting 
India’s use of water as a market commodity and fearing that any hindrance in existing 
water supplies will have dire effects on it economic relevancy. 52 Because of already 
overstretched water supplies, Pakistan plays the role of the laggard due to its dependency 
on Indian originated water and sensitivity that any perceived or potential disruption in its 
flow is a threat to its sustainability.  Pakistan in a sense has ‘failed’ due to the 
inevitability of the Baglihar construction, completion, and potential towards 
marketization. 
The important point of the terminology when applying to South Asia is at what 
point does the marketization of water elicit a response more than opposition or harsh 
rhetoric, but conflict or violence? In the case of South Asia, this would be when Pakistan 
perceives it no longer has control over its own water resource distribution and further 
feels India is directly responsible for the “strangulation of its economy.”53 Lt. Gen. (ret.) 
Khalid Kidwai, Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, specifically notes 
that one of Pakistan’s potential redlines towards nuclear deployment is the condition of 
economic strangulation and specifically “the stopping of the waters of the Indus River.”54 
Kidwai’s statement is meant as a check against Indian aggression and potential usage of 
water as a persuasive tool; however, the question that arises from Kidwai’s statement is 
whether Pakistan can differentiate between Indian hostile actions against Pakistan versus 
decisions aimed towards fulfilling Indian domestic water needs. The prospect of Pakistan 
defending itself with nuclear assets to stop water manipulation is extremely low, but in 
tandem with other sources of conflict, water manipulation as a set of persuasive tools 
could lead to Pakistan perceiving itself as being pushed against a wall.  
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Until now India and Pakistan have illustrated restraint in terms of water rights and 
distribution. This stability, however, will be tested as resources begin to become more 
and more scarce in the region as in the rest of the world. In India, quantitative supply 
problems are increasing. “India will enter the ‘stress zone’ by 2025. Water scarcity due to 
ground water depletion is already a major problem. To complicate matters, water quality 
is also deteriorating. For example, 80 percent of the fourteen perennial rivers in India are 
polluted. Organic pollutants from industrial activities are a major cause of degradation of 
water quality throughout the region. India, for instance, is the third biggest emitter of 
organic water pollutants with 1,651,250 kilograms per day.”55 With the growing scarcity 
of water in the region, India will have to apply a conciliatory approach towards its water 
resources and how it affects its neighbors, including Pakistan. 
 In consideration of how water is distributed through the rivers downstream towards 
Pakistan, India needs to anticipate that Pakistan (as the laggard) will likely react strongly 
towards potential manipulation of the rivers. As Peter Gleick notes “it very clear that 
‘water resources have rarely been the sole cause of conflict’ but should be viewed as a 
‘function of the relationships among social, political, and economic factors, including 
economic development.’”56 This is increasingly important when viewing the persistently 
paranoid relationship between India and Pakistan. While violent conflict has not occurred 
over water, if there comes a time when water resources are stretched thin in conjunction 
with other conflicts, confrontation may occur with conceivably no way to impede 
escalation. It is therefore a testament to the IWT that, even during violent conflicts and 
wars between India and Pakistan, the water continued to flow. This reaffirms the 
necessity of maintaining and strengthening the IWT to keep pace with the continually 
complex region.  
E. WATER’S FUTURE IMPLICATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA 
 The premise that water may be used as symbolic or even strategic capital is not a 
new concept in South Asia. What sets South Asia apart from other regions dealing with 
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water sharing issues is how broader historical conflict between India and Pakistan has 
allowed the two states to anticipate potential tension over the strategic resource. As seen 
with the recent arbitration over the Baglihar Dam, contentious rhetoric was the extent of 
tensions between India and Pakistan. Both the countries largely accepted the IWT ruling. 
While cooperation is likely to become more difficult as the IWT tries to keep pace with 
evolving economic, environmental, and security pressures dependent on water usage, the 
cost of cooperation failure will continue to be too great because of the security 
interdependence that has developed in the region. Cooperation failure over water has the 
potential to affect hundreds of millions of Pakistanis and Indians, leaving cooperation the 
only reasonable approach without risking escalatory conflict. 
The pattern of water supplies is one of an unstable and independent physical 
necessity that is in excess one year and scarce the next. With global climate change, the 
prospect for vast fluctuations in water supplies will place more pressure on already 
strained resources. Further, not only is the quantity of water important, but additionally, 
the quality itself plays a critical role in judging a state’s resources, especially for 
developing states such as Pakistan or India, which do not have advanced water processing 
facilities for general consumption. 57 Because of these compounding problems, shortfalls 
in energy production could stymie Indian GDP growth (7.1 percent projected in fiscal 
year 200958). For Pakistan, a shortfall in water allocation could cripple its already weak 
GDP growth (2.0 percent projected in fiscal year 200959). One of the few bright spots for 
Pakistan is its agricultural growth.60 Therefore, shortfalls in water distribution would 
have detrimental affects on each state’s economies as applied to sustaining GDP growth. 
Applying water as a security concern in South Asia, a look at the history of 
conflicts within the region points to tremendous energy spent by the two countries over 
patches of land with little physical or strategic value. Specifically, the two nations 
                                                 
57 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin Group, 
2005), 53.  
58 The Times of India, “India’s GDP Growth to Stabilize around 7%” 16 March 2009. 
59 Forbes Online, “Pakistan GDP Growth Seen at 2 Percent in 08/09 – Government Official.”  
60 Ibid.  
22 
 
focused on and sacrificed numerous lives on areas of symbolic importance, such as the 
Siachen Glacier War in 1984, and the Kargil Conflict in 1999.61 However, ever since the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the region’s security posture, armed conflicts have 
either remained limited in scope (Brasstacks in 1986, Kargil in 1999) or prevented 
altogether (India Parliament Attack and Military Standoff in 2001-2, Mumbai Terrorist 
Attack in 2008).62 A conflict over water has the potential of affecting hundreds of 
millions of people in the region, while historic conflicts in Kashmir have had limited 
affects on the region’s population. Therefore, if either India or Pakistan chose present day 
defection over future cooperation, large populations would likely suffer direct 
consequences and each side would risk conflict difficult to contain.  
The Kashmir region has several dimensions keeping the two states at odds, which 
include Pakistani perception of India as occupying Muslim territory, India’s frustration 
with Pakistani support of Islamic militants. A long history of low-intensity conflicts and 
intrusions by both states has not helped—most notably the Kargil War of 1999 that saw 
Kashmiri militant and Pakistan military incursions into Indian controlled outposts.63  
When these issues are taken into consideration along with the fact that many of the rivers 
flowing down into Pakistan, originate in Kashmir, it is fortunate India and Pakistan have 
realized the potential dangers of water dispute. The IWT has allowed potential tit-for-tat 
retaliation to be arbitrated by a third party and thus minimizing the risk of violent 
conflict. 
This foresight on water disputes, however, is being tested as both states strive to 
maintain and expand their respective wealth and power. Indian construction of the 
Baglihar dam and Pakistan’s response illustrates the problems of realizing common 
interests in national pursuit of greater wealth and power.64 Until now, Indian and 
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Pakistani disputes over water involve harsh rhetoric, resolution through the IWT, and 
eventual cooperation. However, as the variables of resource scarcity and national 
development continue to grow, stability will continue to depend largely on continual 
cooperation outweighing the costs of present day defection. According to Axelrod, “A 
second reason that the future is less important than the present is that individuals typically 
prefer to get a given benefit today rather than having to wait for the same benefit until 
tomorrow.”65 As domestic pressures continue to mount, disputes become more complex, 
and water resources are stretched, the IWT will likely need to take a greater role in 
resolving present day needs in order to sustain future cooperation. Because cooperation 
failure would significantly destabilize the region’s security interdependence, the cost of 
conflict would likely be too high not to first exhaust all avenues of cooperation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 This above analysis not meant to be a wholly pessimistic vision of India and 
Pakistan. On the contrary, despite historic violence and hostility, the two countries 
historically illustrate responsible behavior when it comes to water sharing because of the 
anticipated disagreements over the resource. Additionally, with the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into the strategic posture of both states the cost of non-cooperation and 
escalatory conflict are too high for either state to risk. The issue now is whether they can 
adapt this responsible behavior to new stresses on its water supply and maintain the 
treaty’s integrity. 
 This chapter is an examination of how historic agreements and security 
interdependence have kept water a cooperative issue between India and Pakistan. 
Historically, India and Pakistan’s mostly non-confrontational behavior in regards to their 
water issues can be explained by the fact that the issues have been solvable. With the 
current dam issues at the Chenab River, and the recent decisions by the World Bank 
expert, it is critical that both sides adhere to the treaty. They also should recognize that  
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the 1960 treaty has been a success in fostering cooperation and in addressing grievances, 
however, the IWT must adapt in order to anticipate population and economic growth 
along with environmental stresses in the region.  
 India and Pakistan have been rife with conflict since partition, however, despite 
this conflict the two states, were able to anticipate the necessity of cooperation over water 
because of the heavy costs both populations would incur if they did not. As Axelrod 
notes, “what makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact the players might 
meet again. The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby 
affect the current strategic situation.66” In the early decades of post-British South Asia, 
India and Pakistan seemed to grasp that while land conflicts could be contained on a 
limited scope, water is an essential strategic resource that in the short term can cause 
severe consequences on large populations if not resolved reasonably. Even more 
importantly, in the past several decades the security interdependence and integration of 
nuclear weapons to both countries militaries leaves non-cooperation over an essential 
resource a costly risk. 
 India and Pakistan’s greatest challenge in the near future is evolving cooperation 
towards an integrated Indus water system despite other issues that surround them.67 If 
India and Pakistan continue to look at water as it relates to the individual state, the 
movement towards non-cooperation is more plausible. However, if India and Pakistan 
can add to the historical success of the IWT, continue to restrict hostilities to rhetoric, and 
move towards a more regional approach towards water, water will remain a dormant 
issue.  
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III. CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Since independence in 1991, the states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have sought 
to translate their position as the source of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers into 
political and economic strength in order to improve both their domestic and foreign 
policy situation. Fundamentally, however, these states are restricted by their own water 
requirements. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water primarily for hydroelectric power 
(especially during the winter) and secondarily for irrigation. In contrast, the downstream 
states Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are already rich in fossil fuel energy 
supplies and require less hydroelectric power. They therefore use water almost entirely 
for irrigation purposes (especially during the summer).68 Befuddling the entire situation 
is the fact that the Central Asian Republics (CARs) current water sharing arrangement is 
based on Soviet era reciprocity agreements meant to be enforced by a central hegemonic 
presence that no longer exists. In post-independence Central Asia, water issues are still 
weakly institutionalized, creating “a domestic political context marked by uncertainty and 
short time horizons.”69  
In the short post-independence history of the CARs, direct violent conflict has not 
arisen over water disputes. Governments in these states, however, have resolved disputes 
with weak agreements that are consistently bent, and eventually collapse. The purpose of 
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this chapter is to address how water in Central Asia has moved from a shared resource 
under Soviet oversight to a commodity exploited for short-term individual state interests 
—leading to cooperation failure. Specifically, with the absence of Soviet control and state 
economies heavily dependent on limited water resources, what is the probability that 
intertwined political, economic, and ecological problems of Central Asian waterways will 
cause instability in the region? Unlike South Asia’s security interdependence and history 
of armed conflict, the CARs interdependence is largely based on domestic economic 
pressures, leading to cooperation breakdown and an inability to forge trust over water. 
This chapter argues that as long the CARs view water in terms of domestic economics 
and not regional stability, the region will continue to produce hollow international 
agreements with little staying power.   
The first section provides a general historical understanding of riparian usage in 
the CARs Aral Sea basin, including a discussion of the demographic challenges and 
geographical dynamics that have created interdependence amongst riparian states.  The 
second section will examine how the Soviet Union managed riparian distribution among 
the Central Asian Soviet republics. The third section describes water distribution issues 
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union.  The fourth section of the chapter will 
provide an overview of the economic needs of and arguments among the upstream states 
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan). It also examines how the varying needs of each state has led to broken 
agreements, exploitation of natural resources, and increased tensions between the 
respective governments. The chapter concludes with discussion of how current riparian 
conditions in the Aral Sea basin will factor in Central Asian stability over the short and 
long-term.  
B. CENTRAL ASIAN WATER HISTORY 
1. Geographical and Demographic Dynamics 
The riparian geography of Central Asia consists of two major rivers that feed into 
the Aral Sea basin, providing for nearly all water consumption in the region.70 The two 
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main rivers, which feed into the Aral Sea and provide ninety percent of all fresh water 
resources to Central Asia, are the Amu Darya River that originates in Tajikistan, and the 
Syr Darya River that begins in Kyrgyzstan.71  “The Aral Sea basin encompasses nearly 
all of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, the Kazakhstani oblasti of 




Figure 2.   The Amu Darya and Syr Darya73 
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The Amu Darya headwaters form in the Pamir Mountains, which is at the tri-
junction of Tajikistan, China, and Afghanistan, forming a border between Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan, and a partial border with Uzbekistan.74 Along the river flow from Tajikistan 
to Uzbekistan, there are multiple canals and reservoirs that effect the eventual water 
distribution to Uzbekistan.75 Additionally, tributary rivers feeding the Amu Darya are 
overdrawn, straining the downward flow towards the Aral Sea, and compounding the 
already exploited river system.76  
The Syr Darya River is similar in its geographical profile. The river originates in 
the Tian Shen Mountains of Kyrgyzstan along with seven tributary rivers that eventually 
cross into Kazakhstan. The Naryn River, which is the most significant tributary river 
along the Syr Darya, is controlled by several dams and canals in Kyrgyz territory—most 
importantly the Toktokul dam which will be further described later on in the chapter. The 
two rivers both feed into the Aral Sea. However, because of the heavy exploitation by 
both the upstream states for hydroelectric use, and the downstream states for agricultural 
needs, the Aral Sea has shrunk to half of its original size since 1960, one of the most 
globally noted ecological and environmental disasters.77 This is event is largely due to 
the partitioning and exploitation of the river basin. 
 Before Soviet heavy industrialization in the 1960s, the Aral Sea region was a 
flourishing ecological land base. Yet even under conservative estimates, historical 
evidence demonstrates that the ecological degradation in the past several decades has 
been catastrophic. The Sarykmysh depression, which lies between the Aral and Caspian 
Seas, was once the Sarykmysh Lake at depths of over 100 meters and was densely 
populated along its shore.78 The rivers in the past were key economic and strategic assets 
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for the populations and economies. During Genghis Khan’s conquest of Central Asia, the 
Mongols were able to break through local resistance by destroying the dams on the Amu 
Darya, allowing the river’s waters to surge and flood the region.79 Soviet placed 
agricultural economies forced increased pressures on the integrated riparian system—
turning the Sarykmysh Lake into a dry depression.80 
Demographics of the area only exacerbate the strains on water resources in 
Central Asia.  Irrigated lands provide for approximately ninety percent of all crops in the 
region and Central Asian provinces derive fifty percent of their water supply from outside 
sources.81 The three downstream states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 
consume 73 percent of all water in Central Asia, have a combined population of over 47 
million, and are dependent on the downstream flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. 
Singling out Uzbekistan (which has the highest CAR population at 27 million), it is 
already estimated that current strained water resources will be insufficient come 2030, 
due to probable increases in populations and global climate changes.82  Further, a United 
Nations team reported that water shortages in 2001, and the affects on agricultural 
outputs, severely affected some 550,000 to 600,000 people in Uzbekistan.83  The 
upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have a combined population of over 12 
million and are only allocated 0.4 percent and 11 percent of their own water supplies, 
respectively.84 These numbers and demographic challenges are important to understand 
the disparity between consumption, control, and overall reliance that the downstream 
states have on this fluctuating resource.85  
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Between the years 1959 and 1989, the population grew by 140 percent to 30 
million and is predicted to grow by nearly a third by 2020.86 This will mean heavy 
agricultural reliance in the Fergana Valley on a river system controlled, at the source, by 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Additionally, the Soviet Union divided the Fergana Valley 
among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with borders weaving in and out among 
ethnic groupings.87  Erika Weinthal has highlighted the critical role the Fergana Valley 
plays in the region. As she notes,  
The Fergana Valley is the backbone for agriculture in Central Asia. Fully 
45 percent of the irrigation area of the Syr Darya basin, for example, is 
located within the Fergana Valley. It contains some of the most vital and 
productive irrigated areas—such as Jalal-Abad and Osh in Kyrgyzstan; 
Andijon, Namangan, and Fergana in Uzbekistan—all of which rely on the 
Syr Darya and its tributaries for irrigation.88 
 
Figure 3.   The Ferghana Valley89 
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Each state, both upstream and downstream, has different requirements for their 
water usage. With tremendous ecological damage done to the Aral Sea basin, the 
downstream states have become nearly exclusively dependent on the riparian system.  
C. THE SOVIET ERA 
Soviet mismanagement profoundly impacted the Amu and Syr Darya rivers, so 
much so that by the mid-1980s, the flow from both rivers was reduced to a trickle barely 
capable of reaching the Aral Sea.90 The Soviet era push towards agricultural development 
in Central strained the region’s water resources due to a focus on water-intensive crops 
and an unprecedented diversion of natural water flow from extensive infrastructural 
changes. 
The Soviet Union introduction of cotton and rice to the CARs produced one of the 
world’s greatest economic development programs and ensuing regional environmental 
disasters. In the 1950s, the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources 
managed agricultural output and water distribution, and focused exclusively on water-
thirsty crops such as cotton and rice. In the post World War II era, the Soviet leadership 
designated the “virgin lands” of Central Asia as the primary location for the Soviet cotton 
industry. This designation precipitated the construction of canals and inter-basin 
diversion canals throughout the Central Asian region.91 The rush to construct and divert 
water resources during Soviet rule led to hastily constructed canals that allowed salty run-
off into ground water and consequentially into the soil—tripling the salt concentration 
between 1960–1990.92 In only 30 years, the heightened salinity levels and river 
diversions for cultivating cotton collapsed a fishing industry that had existed for 
centuries.93 
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These infrastructural changes, in the form of reservoirs, irrigation canals, 
pumping stations, and field canals, in Central Asian waterways expanded irrigated areas 
by 150 percent in the Amu Darya region and 130 percent in the Syr Darya region. 94 
Large portions of the population moved to these newly irrigated lands to farm. As a 
result, agriculture was and remains an important sector of the modern day economies of 
Central Asia. Currently, agriculture contributes 11 percent to the GDP in Kazakhstan, 19 
percent in Tajikistan, 27 percent in Turkmenistan, 33 percent in Uzbekistan, and 38 
percent in Kyrgyzstan.95 Important segments of the Central Asian population quickly 
became dependent on a thriving agricultural industry, and expected the state to maintain 
that level of prosperity. 
The increases in agriculture and population in Central Asia produced 
corresponding increases in the demand for and consumption of water that have had 
catastrophic consequences for the Aral Sea basin’s ecological system. Irrigation 
processes now entirely consume the flow output of the tributary rivers (the Zeravshan, 
Tedzhen, Kashkadarya, and Murgab) that once flowed into the Amu Darya and from 
there into the Aral Sea. As a result, the Amu Darya, whose annual discharge into the Aral 
Sea not long ago was nearly 75-78 cubic kilometers, now contributes nothing at all to the 
Aral Sea. All of the water has been diverted for irrigation purposes, feeding the demands 
of the cotton fields.96 The situation with the Syr Darya is almost as dire. The Syr Darya 
used to have a flow output into the Aral Sea of nearly 34 cubic kilometers of water per 
year and as of now contributes less than 3 cubic kilometers of water.97 Not only are the 
waters being highly stretched to capacity usage, the water itself, once it passes through 
the irrigation process downstream, is unfit for human consumption. “The Aral Sea at the 
present state is an ecological disaster that is far from repair, not to mention that the waters  
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of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya have been repeatedly found to contain chemical 
fertilizers, and high concentrations of harmful components from heavy metals, 
carcinogens, and dangerous bacteria.”98  
The water consumption and distribution problems in the Aral Sea basin will only 
become more complicated in the next several decades, even putting aside the 
environmental problems associated with the degradation of the Aral Sea. The limited 
supply of water needed to irrigate an unnaturally sustainable amount of agricultural land, 
and to meet the energy and consumption requirements of growing populations in the 
region as well as the agreed access to water of neighboring states provided for in 
international law are all growing concerns for the regions’ leaders.99 As leaders in each 
respective state look to expand and grow their economies, there will be continued strain 
on how to manage and distribute this natural resource that fluctuates from year to year.  
D. CURRENT DYNAMICS 
The water issues that Central Asia faces today are largely due to Soviet influence 
on the region through the movement towards water-draining crops such as cotton and 
rice. Before the Soviet Union’s collapse, its centralized institutions were able to manage 
the water distribution system in a manner that took into account the needs of upstream 
states versus downstream states. “Power grids in the region were integrated under a single 
network so that upstream states could export electrical power to downstream states during 
the winter, and import from them during the summer when water was drawn for cotton 
production.”100 Priorities were not established by the individual Soviet republics, but 
rested solely with Moscow and the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, states had to barter agreements on a new basis of 
what was best for the good of each individual state, rather than for the Union as a whole. 
The CARs were thrust at independence into unfamiliar territory where each state was 
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unfamiliar with how to engage in cooperation without a central authority. In such 
conditions, it was unclear whether the CARs would meet the expectation of reciprocity 
that underpins cooperation theory. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a sense of optimism over how water 
would be distributed. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—the weakest politically and 
economically—inherited most of the dams and reservoirs in the system and control of the 
headwaters, while the economically stronger states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan lay downstream.101 Each of the states in 1992 adopted the Almaty 
Agreement, which retained Soviet-period water allocations, and which called on 
signatories to refrain from entering into projects that infringed on other states and to 
openly exchange information.102  
Subsequently, the republics established numerous institutional structures 
including the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) and the subordinate 
Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin Management Authorities (BVOs), which have signed 
over 300 agreements regarding basin management.103 The problems with these 
organizations are their lack of substantial influence over each state’s water policies. 
Mostly, these institutions allow each side to vent their frustrations, but agreements are 
largely ignored based on the state’s short-term interests. These institutions have failed to 
maintain any lasting reciprocity, causing consistent defection amongst the upstream and 
downstream states to the detriment of lasting cooperation.104  
In 1998, a Long Term Framework Agreement explicitly recognized that annual 
and multi-year irrigation water storage has a cost and that it needs to be compensated (to 
the upstream states) through a barter exchange of electricity, fossil fuels, or in cash.105 
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The problem is that the agreements that are enacted do not contain the status of 
international law nor are they recognized by the national legislatures.106 Good intentions 
have led to hollow arrangements that consistently collapse under domestic needs and 
pressures. This has resulted in each state venturing into self-sufficiency as applied to 
water usage and power generation, even at the expense of other state’s needs.  
These poor institutional results confirm the predictions of cooperation theorists. 
Cooperation is easier to achieve in the presence of a powerful state, a hegemon, which 
can enforce the rules, as was the case during the Soviet period. However, as Robert 
Keohane explains, without a hegemonic presence, “the rules of international regimes 
cannot be reliably enforced through centralized organizations. If we view international 
regimes, and their international organizations, as attempts to construct hierarchies, or 
quasi-governments, they will appear weak to the point of ineffectiveness.”107 In the 
absence of a hegemon, cooperation must rest on robust expectations of reciprocal 
behavior, and most crucially, on a calculation that the net benefits of future cooperation 
outweigh the net benefits of not cooperating today.  
In the end, the optimism after the collapse of the Soviet Union of cooperation 
over water distribution resulted in the formation of regional organizations that posses 
little clout to influence or regulate. As Central Asia continues to move beyond Soviet era 
rule (while governed by weak institutions or near dictatorial administrations) the region is 
attempting to establish a stable form of reciprocity in order to avoid potential conflicts. 
However, as the remainder of this chapter suggests, there are no indications the region is 
adapting to its failures that would allow actual sustained cooperation.108 
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E. THE UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM DILEMMA 
1. The Amu Darya 
 Tajikistan relies heavily on the Amu Darya headwaters to supply most of its 
energy needs.109 Tajikistan has and continues to rely significantly on its hydropower 
production (nearly 85 percent); however, this still leaves a gap to be filled by outside 
sources. 110 Further, an energy-swap agreement between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
promises a “mutual supply of energy, which is also irregular because of the capacities of 
the Tajik dam.”111 Tajik officials, as a result, have suggested restarting the Rogun Dam 
project, which was begun under the Soviets in 1976.112 The Rogun Dam project seeks to 
provide an additional 3 million hectares for irrigation downstream, while also providing 
additional hydropower generation.113 Kyrgyzstan, a fellow upstream state, is the only 
state to support this project, because Kyrgyzstan, along with Tajikistan, promotes the idea 
of upstream water commoditization. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, views the project as 
one of Tajikistan’s “various and ambiguous approaches.”114 As the Uzbekistan Foreign 
Minister noted, “Uzbekistan believes that all decisions on the use of watercourses of 
trans-boundary rivers, including the construction of hydro-energy facilities, must in no 
way inflict damage to the ecology and infringe upon the interest of the populations of 
countries on the neighboring territories.”115 With Tajikistan looking to fill its energy gap, 
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and Uzbekistan wishing to ensure its current water allocation without commoditizing, a 
middle ground is yet to be determined on either side. 
 As a midstream state Turkmenistan relies on the downward flow from the Amu 
Darya, originating from Tajikistan and ending in Uzbekistan.  While Uzbekistan is larger 
in terms of population and territory, both countries are allocated the same amount of 22 
cubic kilometers of water per year. Moreover, due to inefficiencies in its water 
infrastructure, Turkmenistan withdraws as much as 30 cubic kilometers of water per 
year.116 In addition to Turkmen water inefficiencies, relations with Uzbekistan have 
suffered because of Turkmenistan’s decision to continue construction of the Kara Kum 
Canal, doubling the original Soviet capacity and threatening increased Amu Darya water 
deficits.117 The Amu Darya presents a compounded problem with three states along the 
river, each utilizing the river for their own economic advantages and incapable of 
adjusting to a post Soviet era of river cooperation.  
2. The Syr Darya 
The Naryan River presents another example of the CARs failing to adhere to 
Soviet hydro-management practices. Originating in Kyrgyzstan, the Naryan River is a 
major tributary of the Syr Darya where five hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) are 
located (Tokotogul, Kurasi, Tashkumyr, Shamaldysai and Uch-Kurgan).118 The 
Tokotogul reservoir, the largest of the five, has an active storage of 14 billion cubic 
meters (BCM) and firm annual yield (i.e., releasable water) of nine BCM on which the 
two downstream states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rely heavily.119 Before 1991 and 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, a strict irrigation regime was in place that limited water  
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release to 180 cubic meters per second during non-vegetation periods (October–March), 
corresponding with the natural flow of the river, while allowing minimum electricity 
generation.120 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was no longer bound to the 
irrigation regime, but this also meant that downstream states were no longer beholden to 
provide supplemental fossil fuel resources. Consequentially, in order to maintain energy 
levels, Kyrgyzstan operated its Naryn cascade in hydropower mode for a longer period of 
time during the winter months to offset the shortages in downstream state energy imports, 
which has led to lower water levels during the summer months and shortfalls for 
agricultural use for downstream states. 121 Kyrgyzstan is left in a precarious position 
where in order to provide energy during the winter months it needs both energy 
supplements from other states and high domestic hydroelectric generation.122  
Kyrgyzstan is left in a situation where it is forced to either release higher 
quantities of water in order to generate necessary energy for its people—causing 
deficiency in water supplies for downstream state agricultural industries—or rely more 
heavily on downstream states to provide energy supplementation that are not guaranteed. 
Given its energy shortfalls, Kyrgyzstan is consistently faced with uncertainty regarding 
downstream states’ willingness to sufficiently provide energy supplements. 123 As reports 
have acknowledged, the more Kyrgyzstan is forced to release during the summer months, 
the higher opportunity costs it incurs.124 The World Bank concluded, “Prices charged for 
fossil fuels by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are somewhat arbitrary and high and are 
explicable only on the basis that the price paid for electricity in the Kyrgyz Republic 
includes a significant element for water storage services. The downstream countries,  
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however, believe that they are being forced to buy during summer, unneeded power from 
the upstream country at a cost substantially higher than the cost of their own 
generation.”125  
While the downstream states may take issue with the necessity of purchasing 
higher cost electricity, the fears stemming from the upstream states are valid if they 
release the necessary amount of water during the summer, creating an energy gap in the 
winter months. Further, costs for maintaining hydroelectric facilities rests solely on the 
upstream states, while the downstream states consume roughly 80 percent of the water.126 
The downstream states, however, feel little need to provide facility compensation since it 
was the upstream states that converted the Toktogul reservoir’s main purpose from 
irrigation to hydroelectric generation.127 
The problem in Central Asia hangs on uncertainty over reciprocity. Will the 
downstream states deliver on their promise of compensation through energy or fiscal 
compensation? According to the World Bank “Once the Kyrgyz Republic releases the 
agreed volume of water in summer and exports electricity, it has to wait till the ensuing 
winter for the compensatory supply of fossil fuels with uncertainties relating to the 
quantity, quality and price. The Kyrgyz Republic believes that it faces a major risk in this 
regard.”128 In Kyrgyzstan, this has forced the movement towards making water a 
“commodity” and has only exacerbated regional tensions. Through international regimes, 
the CARs are called upon to facilitate non-simultaneous exchange (i.e. the upstream 
states hold sufficient water in its reservoirs during the winter and the downstream states 
will provide energy supplements), in order for balanced reciprocity.129 In striving for this 
balance, the regimes or agreements have broken down (as recently as 2008) because of 
excessive drought in Central Asia, high-energy costs and the weakness of upstream 
economies. The spokeswoman for Kyrgyzstan’s national power company stated, 
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“Kyrgyzstan has to purchase energy at world prices from neighboring countries, and as a 
result, we had to transform the water regime to maintain our own energy security.”130 
F. POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
 Looking at current Central Asian dynamics, each state is still trying to establish its 
own identity outside of the sphere of Soviet control. With relatively new responsibilities 
of providing basic infrastructural needs for their respective citizens, governments now 
have to be concerned with generating and maintaining sufficient economic development 
for the population, particularly as the new regimes are either authoritarian and/or unstable 
internally (as evidenced by Kyrgyzstan and the Tulip Revolution, The Tajikistan Civil 
War, etc.)131 Therefore, as long as a competing neighboring state is seen to exploit or 
manipulate basic environmental resources necessary to economic growth and 
development, the policy climate will continue to promote only selfish interests, likely 
resulting in unstable water supplies and cooperation failure.132   
 Central Asian leaders have and continue to deal with “staggering economies, 
collapsing social welfare systems, high levels of corruption, disgruntled populations, an 
increase in Islamic ‘fundamentalism,’ and growing political opposition.”133 These are 
issues that threaten the stability of the CARs, however, they are largely internal state 
issues that are not dependent on neighboring states. Unlike India and Pakistan where the 
interdependence is based on security (the state’s survival is dependent on the other) the 
CARs interdependence is economically based, leaving room for bartering, negotiations, 
and in the end, a trend of cooperation failure. In India and Pakistan, such cooperation 
failure over a strategic resource would likely threaten state survival; in the CARs there is 
more room for argument and disagreement over water without the looming threat of 
harsh international retribution.  
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 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while weaker economically and smaller in population 
than their neighbors, control the water flow of the two main rivers. These two countries, 
however, can only provide for their own resources through increased hydroelectric 
generation and supplemental energy from downstream states rich in natural resources 
such as oil, and natural gas. “In recent years, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have feuded 
over water, borders, and the conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign against Islamic 
radicals. Uzbekistan, which is Central Asia’s largest country in terms of population, has 
not hesitated to exert pressure on its much smaller and poorer neighbor, Kyrgyzstan.”134 
Indeed, water can and has been used as leveraging device by both sides of the stream. 
Consistent with a pattern of retaliation, Uzbekistan halted all deliveries of 
gas to Kyrgyzstan, RFE/RL reported on October 18. Uzbekistan formally 
accused Kyrgyzstan of failing to honor an agreement signed in December 
2000, under which Kyrgyzstan would provide Uzbekistan with 2.2 billion 
kilowatt-hours of hydroelectricity in return for oil and gasoline. Kyrgyz 
Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev has acknowledged this failure. Uzbek 
officials also said Kyrgyzstan had failed to meet a $1.75 million debt 
obligation. Some observers say the Uzbek gas cut-off was aimed to 
pressure Bishkek into reversing its water decision. Kyrgyzstan last winter 
endured a similar gas cut-off, which provoked a severe energy crisis.135 
Already the CARs have displayed little diligence in abiding by resource 
agreements bilaterally or regionally. Leaders of the downstream states of Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have flatly objected to Kyrgyzstan’s plan to sell water as 
a commodity because international law strictly states that water must be made available 
for drinking and sanitation purposes.136 While downstream states have specific rights 
under international law to water for drinking and sanitation, there is certain validity in the 
upstream state’s assessment that they should be entitled to compensation for management 
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and distribution of Central Asia’s vital water resources.137 The downstream states 
continually reiterate that they will not pay for water; however, these states refuse to 
accept the argument that such payments would not pay for water, but would be paying for 
infrastructure upkeep and compensating Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for lost hydropower 
use.138 The CARs are slow to realize that any possibility towards regional cooperation 
rests upon a flexible (ability to adjust to seasonal and environmental variables) water and 
energy distribution system. If the trend towards short-term, loosely observed agreements 
continues to be the norm, the water issue will only continue to infect existing relations 
with tension. 
Without the central Soviet authority to mandate and oversee cooperation within 
Central Asia, the newly minted independent states have entered into unrealistic and 
routinely violated agreements. At root is the lack of agreement on the value of future 
cooperation versus present-day non-cooperation. Robert Axelrod would argue defection 
among players and the ability to develop sustainable cooperation can be improved by 
keeping the value of future cooperation greater than the benefits of defection in the 
present.139  As seen in the examples presented, the upstream states choose cooperation 
failure because the consequence for not providing sufficient energy to its population 
during the winter still outweighs any potential reaction from the downstream CARs. 
What this also points to is the water cooperation process does not hold up to changing 
state conditions and needs. The next section will present some ideas for reducing 
cooperation failure. 
                                                 
137 Gregory E. Heltzer, "Stalemate in the Aral Sea Basin: Will Kyrgyzstan's New Water Law Bring 
the Downstream Nations Back to the Multilateral Bargaining Table?" Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 15, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 306. Also see United Nations, “The Right to Water 
(Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)” 29 November 
2002. 
138 Ibid., 307. 
139 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 126. 
43 
 
G. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AND 
CONCLUSION 
While this case study is an example of cooperation failure, it also shows the region is 
attempting to cooperate; however, this trend of defection cannot continue in the long run 
without regional instability occurring. “Former World Bank Vice President for Europe and 
Central Asia Johannes Linn urged Central Asian countries to settle political and economic 
disputes, including that concerning water use. The region’s long-term stability would depend 
greatly on the ability of Central Asian states to cooperate.”140 Because the individual CARs 
have defected from long-cooperation in order to sustain domestic requirements, global actors 
such as the World Bank and United Nations need to take a more active role in negotiating 
cooperation and arbitrating disputes when needed -- similar to the IWT in South Asia. The 
following is a four-point approach to assessing, managing, and arbitrating water issues from 
Johannes Linn, a former World Bank vice president for Europe and Central Asia. 
1. An expert assessment of the Central Asian water and energy shortage and 
its impacts is needed. The international agencies that have the capacity to 
carry out such an assessment (the Asian Development Bank, the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
and/or the World Bank) should organize such an assessment on a priority 
basis in cooperation with the governments in the region and with regional 
water agencies. 
2.  Depending on the outcomes of such an assessment, regional governments 
and international agencies need to plan emergency responses, similar to 
those delivered during the drought of 2000-01, but possibly at higher and 
more sustained levels. 
 
3.  The UN, the international financial institutions and bilateral international 
partners engaged in Central Asia (including the European Union, China, 
Russia and the United States) should use available diplomatic mechanisms  
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to ensure that possible inter-state tensions over the management of scarce 
water and energy resources in the region are managed effectively without 
spilling over into open conflict. 
 
4.  The long-term prospects of water and energy balances in the region need 
to be assessed in the light of changing climatic conditions, both in terms 
the apparent widening swings of weather cycles, but also in terms of the 
likely impact of long-term of global warming on the water and energy 
resources of Central Asia.141 
 
Water, an issue so important to numerous facets of each state’s economy and 
overall stability, must not be left to loosely observed and nonbinding agreements. 
Tajikistan has even gone as far as to appeal to the United Nations General Assembly to 
focus on the “Central Asia water dilemma.”142 In a region that is still developing, and 
where the government’s survival rely more on its relations with it people versus its 
regional neighbors, domestic needs will continue to trump international cooperation. As 
Linn notes in his plan, the need for global actors to take an active role is likely needed in 
order for sustained cooperation. Additionally, this also provides an opportunity for Russia 
to actively insert itself through diplomacy and infrastructural investments, seeing that 
they still consider the CARs under their sphere of influence.143  
The chapter presents a contrasting case study to South Asia, as in Central Asia 
water is not viewed as a regional security issue, but in terms of fulfilling short-term 
domestic needs. Without the looming threat of conflict or significant retribution from 
regional neighbors, cooperation is consistently undervalued and abandoned once 
domestic pressures increase. The problem with this pattern is that resources will likely 
continue to deteriorate and the CARs will continue to be dependent on each other to 
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provide water and energy. Without sustained and flexible cooperation, the region at the 
very least will see greater stresses on government to provide for their populations, leading 




















The consequences for humanity are grave. Water scarcity threatens 
economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict.144 
—Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary General 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The two case studies of South and Central Asia present contrasting examples of 
how regions manage water-sharing arrangements. Both cases demonstrate existing and 
potential weaknesses in the arrangements. Additionally, in contrast to what one would 
expect from South Asia, which is historically disposed to conflict, water sharing has 
remained a cooperative component of the relationship even during times of hostilities. 
While Central Asia has not been successful in forging consistent reciprocity over water 
after Soviet influence, the region continues to work towards cooperation. This trend of 
cooperation, however, will continue to be tested as independent states struggle with the 
dilemma of maintaining regional stability versus providing economic growth and comfort 
for its own population. 
This chapter will summarize the key lessons derived from the two regional 
examples of South and Central Asia. The next section will summarize how the historical 
trends of cooperation and reciprocity will become increasingly tested by environmental 
and economic factors, leading to a situation known as “The Tragedy of the Commons.” 
Lastly, the chapter will describe future implications for the United States in addressing 
these impending water crises, not just in the two regions described in this thesis, but as 
disputes over water become a growing global issue. 
B. CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
The South Asian (India-Pakistan) case study provides a positive example of how 
water sharing agreements, and disputes that arise, can be resolved through arbitration. 
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Since partition in 1947, the two states have been at odds with each other, mostly 
regarding the territorial dispute over Kashmir. Even to this day, as Pakistan suffers 
continuous attacks from extremist elements originating from its Western Frontiers, the 
military and government sees India as its primary adversary—no differently than it has 
for the last six decades. Therefore, in the grand scheme of the Indo-Pakistani relationship, 
it was realized early on that the benefits of establishing water distribution agreements 
were critical in avoiding conflict. Additionally, because of the foresight by then Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan, the IWT was created to address 
questions of proper water allocation, and if disagreements persisted, the World Bank 
would appoint a neutral arbitrator. The progress and foresight, however, was created 
during a time when water amounts and distribution were fairly consistent and could 
consistently provide for each states needs.  
At present, there are no signs that the IWT is losing legitimacy in India or 
Pakistan. In November 2009, after Pakistan received what it felt as a discouraging 
response from India over the new Indian Kishanganga Hydropower Project, the 
Pakistanis moved to petition for a neutral arbitrator from the World Bank.145 Pakistan’s 
request is a sign of the legitimacy of the institution of the IWT, as is India’s and 
Pakistan’s limitation of hostilities over water to strong rhetoric. 146 The key concern now 
rests on the ability of the IWT to evolve and maintain its relevance as strains on resources 
are predicted to increase. As Stephan Faris notes, 
The treaty's success depends on the maintenance of a status quo that will 
be disrupted as the world warms. Traditionally, Kashmir's waters have 
been naturally regulated by the glaciers in the Himalayas. Precipitation 
freezes during the coldest months and then melts during the agricultural 
season. But if global warming continues at its current rate, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates, the glaciers could 
be mostly gone from the mountains by 2035. Water that once flowed for 
the planting will flush away in winter floods.147 
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Besides the potential humanitarian and environmental disasters that will likely 
ensue, the reciprocity and institutions maintained through the IWT will be severely tested 
if they do not evolve with the changing water dynamics. Realistically, treaties, 
cooperation, and arbitration can only do so much if populations do not receive an 
adequate water supply, which potentially reduces the value of future cooperation. 
Pakistan, according to Faris, is left with three options if this environmental disaster 
occurs: “It can let its people starve. It can cooperate with India in building dams and 
reservoirs, handing over control of its waters to the country it regards as the enemy. Or it 
can ramp up support for the insurgency, gambling that violence can bleed India's resolve 
without degenerating into full-fledged war.”148  The first option, he argues, is not plausible 
for state survival, and the third option is unrealistic as both countries are nuclear-armed 
powers. Faris regards the second option as unlikely because it entails an already paranoid 
Pakistan ceding further control over water distribution.149 Assuming this environmental 
trend does not reverse, India and Pakistan must continue to work from the basis of their 
existing institutions and reciprocity to anticipate the change in status quo. India and Pakistan 
back in 1960 wisely limit their tendency towards conflict over water because of its strategic 
significance and implications towards regional stability. Additionally, since nuclear weapons 
were introduced to the region in 1998, an issue (such as water) that is so fundamental to 
survival for both states is too costly for either side to allow cooperation failure. India and 
Pakistan’s negative history has brought about security interdependence which has pushed 
them to cooperate, however, the two states, with international oversight, must now 
anticipate the inevitable change in the status quo and adapt accordingly or risk facing 
unpalatable consequences.   
In Central Asia, the challenges its countries face are not so much centered on the 
risk of violent escalation, but rather on establishing and maintaining consistent reciprocal 
cooperation and eradicating persistent failure. The roles here are reversed when compared 
to South Asia, in the sense that the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 
economically and militarily less powerful than the downstream states of Uzbekistan and 
                                                 




Kazakhstan. While the downstream CARs rely on the waters from the Amu and Syr 
Darya for most of their agricultural needs, the upstream CARs are heavily dependent on 
energy supplementation from the downstream CARs. During years when the upstream 
CARs required greater energy generation aside from energy supplementation, the 
upstream CARs were forced to sacrifice water distribution agreements in order to fulfill 
their short-term energy needs. In response, downstream CARs would punish the upstream 
states by cutting off the agreed to energy supplements.  
Only in the last two decades has the region existed without Soviet oversight over 
water distribution. As independent states, they have been left with Soviet era expectations 
of reciprocal cooperation without a hegemonic enforcer. With independence, each CAR 
is responsible for its own economic development and the defense of national self-
interests; however, weak institutions and short-term horizons continue to saddle water 
issues, leading to consistent cooperation failures.150 The CARs as newly independent 
states are struggling to balance the delivery of greater wealth and power to their 
populations and their attempts towards regional cooperation and reciprocity.151 Because 
the CARs continue to view water as an economic issue and are more concerned with 
fulfilling short-term domestic needs over potential conflict with neighboring states, future 
cooperation value remains low.  
Unlike in South Asia, the specter of armed conflict has not played into the 
equation of water distribution agreements, which at a certain level has been a 
disadvantage for the region. The CARs appear to have concluded thus far that 
international agreements are breakable under appropriate circumstances. While it is 
unfair to claim that Central Asia is the only region that fails to uphold international 
agreements, it has had an annual track record of seeing agreements form and eventually 
dissolve.  As in South Asia and noted in Chapter III, a neutral third-party arbitrator and 
the international community likely needs to become a central component in the process of 
establishing and maintaining a regional water sharing agreement in order for more 
                                                 
150 Weinthal, “The Promises and Pitfalls of Environmental Peacemaking in the Aral Sea Basin,”  90. 
151 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 22. 
51 
 
successful cooperation to arise; otherwise, as resources continue to be stressed and 
populations continue to grow in the coming decades, the pattern of failure will not be 
tenable and could potentially lead to less tolerable water shortages for the region. If the 
region reaches the point where water is no longer viewed under the guise of economic 
interdependence, but rather state survival, such cooperation failure will likely place 
regional stability at risk.  
C. THE GLOBAL DILEMMA  
 On numerous occasions in this thesis, several issues have consistently stood out 
for their likely negative potential effects on state-to-state cooperation of water sharing: 
expanding populations, increased energy production needs, agricultural sustainability, 
and environmental degradation of water supplies. However, even under current 
conditions in South and Central Asia, the overall trend in the two regions is a tendency 
toward cooperation over conflict. In the case of Central Asia, however, cooperation has 
been unsuccessful and will likely require outside assistance in order establish and 
maintain sustainable cooperation. This trend of choosing cooperation over conflict can be 
seen in other regions of the world as well, including the Middle East.152 As the 
developing problems associated with water sharing become increasingly damaging to 
state economies and populations, however, governments may well be placed in the 
precarious situation of acting to provide for their people—or risk catastrophic economic 
and humanitarian damages. For the trend towards cooperation versus conflict over water 
to continue, therefore, the international community will likely have to take a larger role in 
terms of arbitration, assistance, and conflict resolution. As Dan Smith and Janai 
Vivekananda write, 
In most of the countries that face the double-headed problem of climate 
change and violent conflict, the governments cannot be expected to take 
on the task of adaptation alone. Some of them lack the will, more lack the 
capacity, and some lack both. What is required is international cooperation 
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to support local action, both as a way of strengthening international 
security and to achieve the goals of sustainable development.153 
Many of these states and regions around the world are slowly coming to grips with the 
realization that complications over water will continue to grow as resources become 
increasingly finite. This thesis only dealt with complications as they relate to state-to-
state relations. Another entire study could be devoted to the instability water scarcity may 
cause exclusively within states. As noted in the Chapter Two, in Pakistan, there are 
constant provincial water disputes between the Southern Provinces (Sindh and 
Balochistan) and the Punjab.  Even within the United States, there are reoccurring tussles 
over fair water distributions between individual states, so it is no less important for 
national stability issues.154  
 All evidence examined in this thesis has pointed to a consistent pattern of 
attempted cooperation and reciprocity pertaining to water sharing. However, if the 
predictions and trends indicating increase scarcity and higher demand of water are 
correct, this trend of international cooperation will be tested and tried in a way that has 
not be planned for or anticipated. In 1968, an article from Science magazine was written 
on the looming threat of global overpopulation, known as “the Tragedy of the 
Commons.” In the body of the article, one of the components of overpopulation is the 
anticipated adverse effect on natural resources. The bottom-line states, “[a] finite world 
can support only a finite population. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient 
ethics, and therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable 
world.”155 This is no less relevant forty years later. Understandably, regions including 
South and Central Asia are striving to continue in the direction of economic growth and 
provide greater comfort and success for larger proportions of their populations. 156  Such 
individual state necessity to continually grow and advance, as pertaining to water usage, 
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will likely come into conflict with international efforts to manage water resources. In 
South Asia, there are already inklings of this on the horizon with legitimate Indian 
expansion of hydroelectric facilities in Kashmir engendering justified Pakistani concerns 
over the expansion’s effects on water distribution. At present, the international arbitration 
provided to the region is still highly legitimate in both states. The problem that looms is 
the moment when nature decides to trump human plans for water distribution, economic 
growth, and, humanitarian sustenance. Governments faced with an impending 
humanitarian crisis due to water shortages will have to take action and that action will 
depend on the strength of existing regional institutions for cooperation and the 
international community’s capacity to respond. 
D. PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR THE UNITED STATES 
 The United States, in conjunction with the international community, will likely 
play either a direct or indirect role in maintaining cooperation between states, and if 
needed, provide humanitarian assistance or conflict resolution over water distribution. 
The following lays out suggestions for U.S. policymakers on assistance roles the United 
States can play before a cooperation breakdown between states leads to a humanitarian 
crisis or armed conflict. 
1. Preventive Measures  
a. Project Assistance from the U.S. Government to States and 
International Organizations 
The United States already has an international assistance entity through 
USAID at embassies and consulates. USAID (potentially with the Army Corps of 
Engineers) and the diplomatic corps are well situated to provide recommendations to 
states on preventive measures to increase water use efficiency and distribution. While no 
individual state (including the United States) has the financial capacity for multiple 
regional infrastructural overhauls, in conjunction with the United Nations, The 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, projects outside a single state’s 
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assistance capacity could be spearheaded by these organizations through monetary 
funding and engineering expertise. The United States should take an active role in 
providing assistance and expertise. 
b. Provide Assistance in Regional Negotiations and Arbitration 
Assuming little can be done to prevent impending strains on water 
resources in the short-term, the international community (with the United States) will 
likely play a more active role in arbitrating regional cooperation as resources fluctuate on 
a yearly basis. Before, treaties were established under the assumption that water levels 
would remain relatively consistent. This consistency, however, will likely not be the case, 
and negotiations need to occur on a routine basis to allow flexibility in cooperation. 
Similar to how the World Bank arbitrates when disputes arise between India and 
Pakistan, the international community must assume that disputes will occur routinely and 
must be prepared to intervene before cooperation breaks down. 
c. Identify the Indicators of Potential Water Crises 
While history has shown states tend not to fight over water, the world is 
likely to see strains on water resources not seen before. While conflict is still unlikely, the 
international community must be cognizant of potential indicators and warning of 
humanitarian crises and potential violent conflict due to water distribution shortages.  
One potential indicator would be persistent domestic violent uprisings 
against the state that can be traced to water shortages. If a state government feels it is 
under siege from its own people, it may deflect some of the hostility by placing blame on 
another state for the water crisis. In the case of India and Pakistan, this would be fairly 
easy to accomplish because of their hostile history.  Additionally if a state government 
officially makes inflammatory rhetoric to include making ultimatums against another 
state, the international community will need to intervene before hostilities escalate 
outside of harsh rhetoric.  
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E. CONCLUSION  
 The intent of this thesis has been to investigate the potential for conflict between 
states over shared water resources and which conditions might allow for successful 
cooperation over water. The case studies illustrate that when comparing South Asia and 
Central Asia, successful cooperation is dependent on the structural nature of state-to-state 
relations. With India and Pakistan, their interdependence is one based on security. With 
each side having such potent military capabilities, choosing sustained cooperation is still 
the more practical choice. To allow cooperation failure over a strategically vital issue 
puts the survival of both states at risk. Conversely, in Central Asia, water is still viewed 
through economics and fulfillment of short-term domestic needs. While cooperation has 
been attempted, state survival is not dependent on sustained cooperation, rather the 
government’s relations with its population. As resources become scarcer, whether due to 
environmental factors and/or population growth, states will have to consistently weight 
the risk of inflaming regional hostilities against providing for the growth and needs of its 
population. If nothing can be done to prevent the environmental consequences on water 
supplies, it will then be up to the international community and the United States to accept 
and prepare for their responsibility towards ensuring each state abiding by its promises. 
Where states could once be trusted to abide by its agreements, in a future world of scarce 
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